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International Law: 
Explaining International Acts1 
 
Chimène I. Keitner 
 
In international law as in domestic law, the why of State action 
matters, not just the what of State action.  The “culture of justification” 
that exists at the international level includes an expectation that States 
will articulate the legal and policy bases for their actions, particularly 
when such actions depart from accepted norms of State behavior.2  In a 
variety of contexts, States are expected—and seek—to explain their 
international acts. 
Although deliberative processes that lead to international acts may 
not be judicially reviewable to the same extent as those that lead to 
purely domestic acts, the push for transparency among domestic 
constituencies, as well as other oversight mechanisms, create ex ante 
incentives for integrity in decision-making processes and rationales in 
the conduct of foreign affairs.  In addition, ex post explanations of 
international acts may themselves carry legal significance as 
expressions of a State’s opinio juris, or sense of legal obligation. 
Scholars and practitioners should not discount the culture of 
justification that exists at the international level, even outside 
international courts and tribunals. 
 
Forms and Functions of International Legal Justification 
 
International legal rules can create, shape, and constrain policy 
options in the conduct of foreign affairs.  In government as in the 
private sector, policy clients want to understand what the rules are, why 
and how they apply, and what courses of conduct are legally available.  
They may also seek to identify opportunities to shape the legal 
environment in which they operate, in order to maximize the material 
and nonmaterial benefits enjoyed by stakeholders.  Articulating public 
                                                 
 1. Summarized and excerpted from Chimène I. Keitner, Explaining 
International Acts, 63 MCGILL L.J. 1 (2018).  The author served as Counselor 
on International Law in the U.S. Department of State in 2016-2017.  This 
article was written after she left that position and does not necessarily reflect 
the views of the U.S. government. 
 2. Étienne Mureinik, A Bridge to Where? Introducing the Interim Bill of 
Rights, 10 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 31 (1994) (introducing the term “culture of 
justification”). 
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justifications for their international acts enables States to shape the 
understandings and expectations of other actors in the international 
legal system. 
Foreign ministry legal advisers act as intermediaries between the 
domestic and international legal realms by translating international law 
for domestic decisionmakers, and by conveying a State’s international 
legal positions to foreign counterparts.  Internally, foreign ministry 
legal advisers identify what actions a State can take consistent with its 
international (and, at times, domestic) legal obligations.  Certain 
actions may be, in the words of former U.S. State Department Legal 
Adviser Harold Koh, “lawful but awful.”3  Others fall squarely within 
the range of legally available options, and legal advisers can help 
policy clients map out the potential implications and repercussions of 
different approaches.  Yet other actions may, in rare circumstances, be 
deemed “illegal but legitimate,”4 such as the NATO air campaign in 
Kosovo in the spring of 1999.  The legal reasoning underpinning this ex 
ante advice is generally shielded from public view, at least at the time it 
is issued, to promote comprehensiveness and candor. 
Publicly articulating the international legal rationales that underpin 
a State’s actions may serve a variety of functions, in addition to 
clarifying and crystallizing the rules of customary international law, 
which are formed by nearly uniform state practice accompanied by a 
sense of legal obligation.  U.S. Secretary of State Elihu Root, who was 
later awarded a Nobel Peace Prize for his work on international 
arbitration, posited in 1907 that “[t]he more clearly and universally the 
people of a country realize the international duties and obligations of 
their country, the less likely they will be to resent the just demands of 
other countries that those obligations and duties be observed.”5 
U.S. State Department Legal Advisers have long engaged in “legal 
diplomacy” with U.S. partners, and have also endeavored to explain the 
international legal framework governing U.S. actions to a wider 
audience.  For example, in 2016, State Department Legal Adviser Brian 
Egan stated that “[l]egal diplomacy builds on common understandings 
of international law, while also seeking to bridge or manage the 
specific differences in any particular State’s international obligations or 
                                                 
 3. Harold Hongju Koh, The State Department Legal Adviser’s Office: 
Eight Decades in Peace and War, 100 GEO. L.J. 1747, 1758 (2012). 
 4. THE INDEPENDENT INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON KOSOVO, THE 
KOSOVO REPORT: CONFLICT, INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE, LESSONS LEARNED 4 
(2000). 
 5. Elihu Root, The Need of Popular Understanding of International Law, 
1 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 2 (1907). 
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interpretations.”6  Egan emphasized that “[e]ven if other governments 
or populations do not agree with our precise legal theories or 
conclusions, we must be able to demonstrate to others that our most 
consequential national security and foreign policy decisions are guided 
by a principled understanding and application of international law.”7 
In the United States, the role of setting forth such explanations 
often falls to the State Department Legal Adviser, whose ability to 
speak authoritatively on behalf of the U.S. Government is buttressed by 
his or her status as a Senate-confirmed official.  Although the task of 
public explanation may fall to different officials in different countries, 
States routinely use legal terms to describe their own actions and 
characterize other States’ behavior.  Even if some of this “international 
law talk” is strategic, reference to international law has become 
embedded in States’ decisionmaking and shapes their assessment of 
legally available courses of conduct, whether or not that conduct is 
judicially reviewable. 
States’ practice of justification extends beyond foreign ministries. 
Government lawyers across agencies may also coordinate directly 
regarding their respective legal interpretations and craft public 
communications setting forth shared legal views. International law thus 
not only shapes—and is shaped by—interactions and negotiations 
among States, but also by interactions and negotiations among different 
agencies within States, each with its own institutional culture, equities, 
perspective, and personnel.  Although such interactions are more likely 
to characterize deliberations in liberal democracies than authoritarian 
States, they illustrate a convergence between domestic and international 
decisionmaking processes, and the role of law in each, across a range of 
issue-areas.   
 
Justifying Uses of Force 
 
When a State engages in acts that are not self-evidently 
reconcilable with accepted international legal rules, that State has three 
basic options with regard to public explanation: (1) offering a legal 
rationale and attempting to persuade relevant audiences that its actions 
can be accommodated within existing legal rules, or that the legal rules 
should be modified; (2) offering a policy rationale, while attempting to 
                                                 
 6. Brian Egan, International Law, Legal Diplomacy, and the Counter-
ISIL Campaign: Some Observations, 92 INT’L L. STUD. 235, 244 (2016). 
 7. Id. at 247. 
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preserve the integrity and binding force of potentially conflicting legal 
rules; and (3) remaining silent. 
By way of illustration, the United Kingdom and the United States 
adopted different approaches in justifying their respective participation 
in the NATO bombing campaign in Kosovo in 1999.  The United 
Kingdom chose the first option, embracing humanitarian intervention 
as internationally lawful in certain circumstances, even absent Security 
Council authorization.  The United States, by contrast, chose the second 
option.  As Acting Legal Adviser Michael Matheson explained, “[t]here 
was broad consensus within NATO that armed action was required to 
deal with intolerable atrocities by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(FRY) in Kosovo, but also a shared concern that the chosen 
justification not weaken international legal constraints on the use of 
force.”8  As a result, “NATO decided that its justification for military 
action would be based on the unique combination of a number of 
factors that presented itself in Kosovo, without enunciating a new 
doctrine or theory.”9  He acknowledged that “[t]his process was not 
entirely satisfying to all legal scholars,” but in his view “it did bring the 
Alliance to a position that met our common policy objectives without 
courting unnecessary trouble for the future.”10 
The problem of “courting unnecessary trouble for the future” is 
difficult to avoid in a legal system in which norms are shaped by 
behavior, as underscored by Jack Goldsmith’s later assessment of “the 
precedential value of the Kosovo non-precedent precedent for 
Crimea.”11  Regardless of accompanying disclaimers, the rationale 
offered for past actions will, predictably, be invoked by other actors in 
defense of their own conduct.  This does not, however, mean that 
precedents are infinitely malleable.  When Vladimir Putin cited the 
“well-known Kosovo precedent” to justify the annexation of Crimea,12 
many observers rejected this as spurious.  As with any system of 
argumentation and legitimation, the mere ability to advance an 
argument does not mean that the argument will be accepted as valid by 
other participants in the system. 
                                                 
 8. Michael J. Matheson, Justification for the NATO Air Campaign in 
Kosovo, 94 ASIL PROC. 301 (2000). 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Jack Goldsmith, The Precedential Value of the Kosovo Non-Precedent 
Precedent for Crimea, LAWFARE (Mar. 17, 2014); see also Jack Goldsmith, The 
Kosovo Precedent for Syria Isn’t Much of a Precedent, LAWFARE (Aug. 24, 
2013). 
 12. Address by President of the Russian Federation (Mar. 18, 2014). 
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When the United Nations Security Council declines to exercise its 
power to authorize intervention in situations of mass atrocities under 
Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, States that are unwilling to forego the 
use of force as a foreign-policy tool must either craft theories of 
humanitarian intervention or invoke (and possibly seek to expand) 
definitions of permissible acts of self-defense.  Some States articulate 
ex ante legal rationales, whereas others may let the ex post reactions of 
other States (whether in the form of condemnation or acquiescence) 
serve as a barometer of the perceived conformity of an act with the 
applicable legal framework.  Although the constraining function of law 
and its accompanying culture of justification are more visible when 
actors offer legal rationales explicitly, actors’ sensitivity to the 
reactions of other community members also attests to the character of 
the international community as one governed by norms and not just 
sheer power. 
 
Lawyers, Policymakers, and Public Discourse 
 
The distinction between what countries say and do as a legal 
matter, and what they say and do as a matter of policy, carries 
significant weight in a system of customary international law built on 
evidence of state practice accompanied by opinio juris.  Some have 
expressed the view that, in the words of former U.K. Foreign Secretary 
Jack Straw, “the range of reasonable interpretations [of international 
law] is always almost greater than in respect of domestic law.”13  This 
overstates the case.  In domestic as in international law, however, the 
test of an interpretation’s “reasonable[ness]” lies in the reactions of the 
relevant interpretive community, which may include a range of 
domestic government actors, foreign governments, and international 
bodies. 
Members of civil society also belong to the interpretive community 
of international lawyers.  In the absence of voluntary public 
communication or release of legal and policy justifications, 
governmental entities may be compelled to make certain documents 
public under applicable provisions of national freedom-of-information 
acts.  There are, however, strict limits on compelled disclosure.  For 
example, in Corderoy & Ahmed, the U.K. Upper Tribunal upheld the 
Information Commissioner’s decision to deny requests for legal advice 
given to the Attorney General about a British drone attack in Syria in 
                                                 
 13. Letter titled Iraq: Second Resolution from Foreign Secretary Jack 
Straw to Attorney General (Feb. 6, 2003). 
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2015 that killed two British citizens.14  The event was significant in part 
because it was “the first time in modern times that a British asset ha[d] 
been used to conduct a strike in a country where [the United Kingdom] 
is not involved in a war.”15 
The Corderoy court appended to its opinion the April 27, 2016, 
Report of the Joint Committee on Human Rights of the House of Lords 
and House of Commons, which disavowed any desire “to see the 
Governments’ confidential legal advice” while insisting that 
“considerations of transparency and democratic accountability require 
the Government to explain publicly its understanding of the legal basis 
on which it takes action which so seriously affects fundamental 
rights.”16  In the Joint Committee’s view:  
 
When dealing with an issue of such grave importance, taking a 
life in order to protect lives, the Government should have been 
crystal clear about the legal basis for this action from the 
outset.  They were not.  Between the statements of the Prime 
Minister, the Permanent Representative to the UN and the 
Defence Secretary, they were confused and confusing.17 
 
The Joint Committee’s request for clarification from the 
government represents another contribution to international law’s 
culture of justification, embedded within the U.K.’s domestic culture of 
legal justification and consultation of Parliament. 
This and other examples illustrate the continuing relevance, and 
limits, of former U.S. State Department Legal Adviser Abram Chayes’s 
observation that “the requirement of justification provides an important 
substantive check on the legality of action and ultimately on the 
responsibility of the decision-making process.”18  On the one hand, 
government lawyers must, as a general matter, be able to articulate a 
“reasonable” account of a proposed action’s international lawfulness in 
order for that action to be considered.  On the other hand, as illustrated 
by the Chilcot Inquiry into the United Kingdom’s controversial 
decision to participate in military action in Iraq in 2003, legal advice is 
rarely insulated from perceived policy imperatives, and lawyers will 
                                                 
 14. Corderoy & Ahmed v. IC, A-G & CO [2017] UKUT 495 (AAC). 
 15. Id. at ¶ 12. 
 16. Id., Schedule to Decision at ¶ 3.7. 
 17. Id. at ¶ 3.18. 
 18. ABRAM CHAYES, THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS: INTERNATIONAL CRISES 
AND THE ROLE OF LAW 42 (1974). 
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often (although not invariably) endeavor to accommodate political 
decisionmakers’ desired courses of action within available legal 
frameworks.19  Public debate about the lawfulness of particular actions, 
both within other branches of government and among members of civil 
society, can help create pressures for more robust legal justifications 
(for example, raising the threshold for what counts as a “reasonable” 
interpretation) and impose additional costs on decisionmakers for 
taking actions that deviate too widely from accepted norms of behavior. 
International law does not, as a general matter, require States to offer 
affirmative public justifications for their actions.  However, States 
routinely offer explanations (and respond to others’ explanations) in 
various fora in response to community expectations, and in order more 
effectively to influence the evolution of standards of behavior within 
the community. 
In the end, international law’s culture of justification—comprised 
of the exchanges prompted by public interpretations and elucidations of 
applicable rules—provides the context within which international legal 
actors operate.  In the international arena, the farther away an action 
falls from the agreed core of legally available options, the more likely it 
is to generate international condemnation, and to lead to the imposition 
of diplomatic and other costs on the offending actor.  In the domestic 
sphere, at least in liberal democratic States, the absence of an 
acceptable international legal justification provides constituents with a 
basis for challenging and scrutinizing governmental actions. As Evan 
Criddle and Evan Fox-Decent have observed, “[t]he compulsion of 
legality, of course, provides no assurance against an executive 
determined to breach its international legal obligations, or (what is 
more likely) to interpret them in an unreasonable manner.”20  However, 
they continue, “the compulsion of legality is a necessary condition of 
constitutional democracy because it embodies the rule of law,” 
including the State’s “unwillingness to reject openly the legal basis of 
its legal and political authority.”21  While Criddle and Fox-Decent 
emphasize the important role of international courts, less formal 
mechanisms—such as domestic and supranational committees of 
inquiry, diplomatic correspondence, and the “court of public 
opinion”—also play a crucial role in setting the expectation that States 
will explain their international acts, and that their acts will, by and 
large, conform to generally accepted notions of legally justifiable 
                                                 
 19. 5 THE REPORT OF THE IRAQ INQUIRY § 5 (July 6, 2016). 
 20. EVAN J. CRIDDLE & EVAN FOX-DECENT, FIDUCIARIES OF HUMANITY: 
HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW CONSTITUTES AUTHORITY 330 (2016). 
 21. Id. 
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conduct.  By speaking the language of international law, States engage 
in conversations that help define the terms of, and create the conditions 
for, their coexistence.  
 
